I vigorously opposed the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) because I believed then — as I
believe now — that the Obama administration, in its desperation for a
legacy-creating deal, negotiated a weaker deal than we could have obtained. The
JCPOA did not deliver anywhere/anytime inspections as promised or constrain
Iran’s ballistic missile program. The JCPOA provided sanctions relief
up-front and contains a highly troubling sunset clause. Nevertheless, the
agreement is in place now, and the question is whether to stay in or exit.
Circumstances have undeniably changed, both because of the new president and
the operation of the deal itself. Here I part company with many who
opposed the deal and now want the United States to exit.
Both supporters and
opponents of the original deal rightly point out the unworkability of a U.S.
withdrawal.
I would not recommend
pulling out of the deal now — not when the International Atomic Energy Agency,
whose inspectors monitor 27 separate sites, has certified that Iran
is in compliance. Instead of nuking the nuclear deal, the United States should
take other steps to check the growth of Iranian influence.
It would send a terrible
signal to other states that in the future might be interested in concluding an
arms control treaty with the United States if Washington were to abrogate a
treaty simply because of a change of administrations. Why would anyone trust
Washington to keep its word ever again?
Pulling out of the treaty
now would isolate not Iran but the United States. If the Trump administration
simply leaves the treaty, without re-imposing meaningful sanctions on Iran, the
effect would be purely symbolic — and the symbolism would be of America
standing alone. . . .Pulling out of the Iran deal without a reasonable
provocation would only create international sympathy for Iran in spite of its
appalling human-rights violations — and it would most likely leave the
agreement in place anyway.
He doubts we’d be able to
coax Iran back to the table. He asks “why would Iran, which resisted any
[further] limits in 2015 at a time when it was under heavy sanctions, agree to
them now, after already having gotten an economic windfall from having
sanctions lifted? Even if [President] Trump can now re-impose some penalties,
it will not be nearly as many as existed prior to the Iran deal.”
Brian
Katulis of the Center for American Progress supported the
JCPOA, so its critics might discount his argument for remaining in the deal.
However, the rationale for not exiting is strikingly similar to Boot’s in some
respects:
Without European
support—and the reimposition of European sanctions in particular—it is unlikely
the United States will be able to strike a better bargain on Iran’s nuclear
program. Moreover, if the United States attempts to unilaterally reimpose
secondary sanctions on foreign companies doing business with Iran, countries
such as China and India will likely ignore or circumvent such measures. . .
.
There is little reason to
believe that Trump’s combination of bluster, strategic impatience,
international isolation, and diminished leverage would produce a better deal.
In fact, there are many reasons to worry that the outcome will be a broken
agreement, unnecessarily heightening the risk of military conflict or nuclear
breakout
Like Boot, Katulis et al. worry: “Whatever slim prospects
exist today for a diplomatic resolution of the North Korea question will
evaporate should President Trump provide concrete proof that the United States
cannot be trusted to honor its agreements.”
So what can be done? Boot
argues there are a range of options if we want to “curb Iran’s dangerous
designs without scrapping the agreement, negotiating a new treaty with the
mullahs, or going to war against them”:
The Trump administration
is already … imposing sanctions on companies linked to Iran’s ballistic missile
program, its cyberattacks, and its terrorist-sponsoring Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). There is much more to be done on the targeted
sanctions front, including designating the IRGC a terrorist organization. But
there are also important steps that Trump can take on the ground in Syria and
Iraq. …
In the case of Iraq, that
would mean insisting that, once the Islamic State is defeated, the government
disband the Popular Mobilization Forces, made up mostly of Iranian-backed
militias, and create a Sunni civil guard to protect Sunni areas from Shiite
aggression. That will not be easy to do, but the United States can gain
important leverage if it does not bring its troops home after the Islamic State
is defeated — if, that is, it does not repeat the mistake that former President
Barack Obama made in 2011.
(Incidentally, had the
Trump administration really wanted to reverse Obama policy and deny a foothold
to Iran in Syria, it would not have ceded the country to Vladimir Putin and his
junior Tehran partners via an ill-conceived cease-fire.)
Katulis et al.
likewise see avenues to pressure Iran and contain its nuclear and non-nuclear
ambitions. In addition to expanding our intelligence capacity and our
intelligence-sharing with regional allies, they recommend stepped-up
interdiction of material and weapons “to terrorist and militant groups
undermining regional stability: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian
territories, Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq.” They also favor
“clear redlines when it comes to interference with freedom of navigation and
U.S. naval operations and be prepared to back them up with action. Overall, the
goal should be to deter Iranian proxies from taking actions that either
inherently destabilize the region or have the potential to ignite a larger
conflict.”
On the topic of Iran’s
ballistic missile program, Katulis et al. argue that the “United States should
continue the substantial investments it has made to enhance regional partners’
missile defense capabilities. It should also step up the efforts of diplomatic,
intelligence, and law enforcement entities to prevent sales and shipments of
technologies that have helped Iran increase its ballistic missile
capabilities.”
We agree it would be a mistake
to construct a flimsy case accusing Iran of violating the JCPOA. Even more
damaging would be a unilateral pullout without the support of our allies. Trump
would wind up cementing his reputation as an irresponsible aggressor. A
combination of sanctions in response to non-nuclear activities (e.g. human
rights violations, regional aggression, missile testing) and improvement of our
military posture and intelligence capabilities in the region would be the best
short-term solution.
Moreover, let’s not forget
that it’s the regime, not the Iranian people, with whom we have serious
differences. Katulis et al. write on this topic: “The United States also needs
to compete in a battle of ideas to inspire the people of the region, address
longstanding drivers of instability, and offer a better alternative to Iran’s
ideological agenda. … A more credible, consistent approach would raise the
pressure on Iran at home; help deny it opportunities abroad; and position the
United States to address drivers of instability in the years ahead.” Such
actions would not commit us to military-backed regime change any more than
such efforts committed us to military overthrow of the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.
Short-term containment with the long-term objective of a peaceful and
non-jihadist Iran is the best — I would argue, the only —
viable Iran approach at this point. Frankly, thinking Trump can handle
simultaneous nuclear confrontations with North Korea and Iran is a dangerous
delusion.
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